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THE DEFINITION OF DISABILITY:
PERSPECTIVE OF THE DISABIITY COMMUNITY
DEBORAH KAPLAN, J.D.*
INTRODUCTION
The questions of the definition of "person with a disability" and
how persons with disabilities perceive themselves are knotty and com-
plex. It is no accident that these questions are emerging at the same
time that the status of persons with disabilities in society is changing
dramatically. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)1 is the cause
of some of these changes, as well as the result of the corresponding
shift in public policy.2 Questions of status and identity are at the heart
of disability policy. One of the central goals of the disability rights
movement, which can claim primary political responsibility for the
ADA, is to move American society to a new and more positive under-
standing of what it means to have a disability.
Part I of this Article describes the four historical and social mod-
els of disability, as defined by disability policy scholars. Part II in-
cludes an analysis of the ADA definition of disability and case law
interpreting that definition. Part III describes the United States
Supreme Court's recent interpretation of disability under the ADA
and the reaction of the disability community to this interpretation.
I. DISABILITY MODELS
Disability policy scholars describe four different historical and so-
cial models of disability: (1) a moral model of disability which regards
disability as the result of sin; (2) a medical model of disability which
regards disability as a defect or sickness which must be cured through
medical intervention; (3) a rehabilitation model, an offshoot of the
medical model, which regards the disability as a deficiency that must
be fixed by a rehabilitation professional or other helping professional;
and (4) the disability model, under which the problem is defined as a
dominating attitude by professionals and others, inadequate support
* J.D., Boalt Hall School of Law, 1976; Executive Director, World Institute on
Disability.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
2. SeeJonathan C. Drimmer, Comment, Cipples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights: Tracing
the Evolution of Federal Legislation and Social Policy for People with Disabilities, 40 UCLA L. REv.
1341, 1397 (1993).
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services when compared with society generally, as well as attitudinal,
architectural, sensory, cognitive, and economic barriers, and the
strong tendency for people to generalize about all persons with disa-
bilities overlooking the large variations within the disability
community.'
The moral model is historically the oldest and is less prevalent
today.4 However, there are still many cultures that associate disability
with sin and shame,5 and disability is often associated with feelings of
guilt, even if such feelings are not overtly based in religious doctrine.6
For the individual with a disability, this model is particularly burden-
some. This model has been associated with shame on the entire fam-
ily that has a member with a disability.7 Families have hidden away the
disabled family member, keeping them out of school and excluding
them from any chance at having a meaningful role in society.8 Even
in less extreme circumstances, this model has resulted in general so-
cial ostracism and self-hatred.
The medical model came about as modern medicine and the en-
hanced role of the physician in society began to develop during the
nineteenth century.9 Due to the fact that many disabilities have medi-
cal origins, people with disabilities were expected to benefit from the
direction of the medical profession. 10 Under this model, the
problems that are associated with disability are deemed to reside
within the individual." In other words, if the individual is "cured"
then these problems will not exist.1 2 Society has no underlying re-
sponsibility to make a "place" for persons with disabilities, since they
live in an outsider role waiting to be cured."3
The individual with a disability is in the sick role' 4 under the
medical model. When people are sick, they are excused from the nor-
3. See David Pfeiffer, The Disability Paradigm and Federal Policy Relating to Children
with Disabilities 6 (1998) (unpublished manuscript on file with Journal of Health Care Law
& Policy).
4. See Drimmer, supra note 2, at 1346.
5. See Pfeiffer, supra note 3, at 2.
6. See Drimmer, supra note 2, at 1346 n.14; Pfeiffer, supra note 3, at 2.
7. See Drimmer, supra note 2, at 1346 n.14; Pfeiffer, supra note 3, at 2.
8. See Anne E. Beaumont, Note, This Judicial Estoppel Has Got to Stop: Judicial Estoppel
and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1529, 1537 (1996).
9. See Drimmer, supra note 2, at 1361; Pfeiffer, supra note 3, at 2.
10. See Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidescope, 74 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 621, 650
(1999); Drimmer, supra note 2, at 1347; Pfeiffer, supra note 3, at 2-3.
11. See Crossley, supra note 10, at 649; Pfeifer, supra note 3, at 3.
12. See Crossley, supra note 10, at 650.
13. See id. at 650-52; Drimmer, supra note 2, at 1348.
14. See Talcott Parsons, Definitions of Health and Illness in the Light of American Values and
Social Structure, in PATIENTS, PHYSICIANS, AND ILLNESS 165, 176-78 (E. Gartlyjaco ed., 1958).
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mal obligations of society: going to school, getting a job, taking on
family responsibilities, etc.15 They are also expected to come under
the authority of the medical profession in order to get better.16 Thus,
until recently, most disability policy issues have been regarded as
health issues, and physicians have been regarded as the primary au-
thorities in this policy area.1 7
One can see the influence of the medical model in disability pub-
lic policy today, most notably in the Social Security system, in which
disability is defined as the inability to work. i" This is consistent with
the role of the disabled person as sick. It is also the source of enor-
mous problems for persons with disabilities who want to work but who
would risk losing all related public benefits, such as health care cover-
age or access to Personal Assistance Services (for in-home chores and
personal functioning), since a person loses his or her disability status
by going to work.19
The rehabilitation model is similar to the medical model; it re-
gards the person with a disability as in need of services from a rehabili-
tation professional who can provide training, therapy, counseling, or
other services to make up for the deficiency caused by the disability. 20
Parsons describes the sick person role as institutionally defined. He defines four specific
elements of the role of the "sick person." First, the individual is not held responsible for
the illness, as it is beyond his or her control. See id. at 176. Second, the sick person is
'exempt" from performing his or her normal societal obligations and tasks, at least for the
duration of the illness. See id. Third, the sick person is in a conditionally legitimated state
but only if the individual realizes that he or she has an obligation to get well. See id. at 176-
77. Finally, in order to attain that "socially legitimated state," the sick person must make an
effort to seek competent medical assistance with the intent to become well. See id. at 177;
see also Crossley, supra note 10, at 650; Drimmer, supra note 2, at 1347-48; Pfeiffer, supra
note 3, at 3.
15. See Pfeiffer, supra note 3, at 3, 5.
16. See Crossley, supra note 10, at 650; Pfeiffer, supra note 3, at 3, 5; see also Earl D.
McBride, The Classic Concept of Disability, 221 CaNIcAL ORTHOPAEDICS & RELATED Rs. 3, 13
(1987).
17. See Crossley, supra note 10, at 650-51.
18. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1) (1994).
19. See Help the Disabled Work, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1998, at M4; see also COMMITTEE ON
WAYS AND MEANS, TIcKET TO WORK AND WORK INCENTIVES IMPROVEMENT AcT OF 1999, H.R.
Doc. No. 106-393, pt. 1 at 51, 54-55, 79-80 (1999). The Ticket to Work and Work Incen-
tives Improvement Act of 1999 was designed in order to ease the transition of disabled SSI
recipients into the workforce by expanding access to vocational rehabilitation and employ-
ment support services and extending health care coverage for disabled beneficiaries who
return to work. See id. at 4. The Committee on Ways and Means reported that prior to
creation of the Act, Social Security disability beneficiaries faced losing health care cover-
age, cash benefits, and other support services upon returning to work. See id. at 51, 54-55,
79-80.
20. See Crossley, supra note 10, at 650; Drimmer, supra note 2, at 1361; McBride, supra
note 16, at 13; Pfeiffer, supra note 3, at 3.
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Historically, it gained acceptance after World War II when many dis-
abled veterans needed to be re-introduced into society.2 ' The current
Vocational Rehabilitation system is designed according to this
model. 2
Persons with disabilities have been very critical of both the medi-
cal model and the rehabilitation model. While the individual can re-
quire medical intervention at times, it is naive and simplistic to regard
the medical system as the appropriate locus for disability-related pol-
icy matters. A cure for many disabilities and chronic medical condi-
tions will never be found. Persons with disabilities are quite capable
of participating in society, and the practices of confinement and insti-
tutionalization that accompany the sick role are simply not acceptable.
The disability model has taken hold as the disability rights and
independent living movements have gained strength. This model re-
gards disability as a normal aspect of life, not as a deviance, and rejects
the notion that persons with disabilities are in some inherent way "de-
fective. '2' As Professor David Pfeiffer has put it:
It depends upon the concept of normal. That is, being a
person with a disability which limits my mobility means that I
do not move about in a (so-called) normal way. But what is
the normal way to cover a mile . . .? Some people would
walk. Some people would ride a bicycle or a bus or in a taxi
or their own car. Others would use a skate board or in line
roller blades. Some people use wheelchairs. There is, I ar-
gue, no normal way to travel a mile.2 4
Most people will experience some form of disability, either per-
manent or temporary, over the course of their lives. Given this reality,
if disability were more commonly recognized and expected in the way
that we design our environments or our systems, it would not seem so
abnormal.
The disability model recognizes social discrimination as the most
significant problem experienced by persons with disabilities and as
the cause of many of the problems that are regarded as intrinsic to the
disability under the other models.
The cultural habit of regarding the condition of the person,
not the built environment or the social organization of activi-
ties, as the source of the problem, runs deep. For example,
21. See Drimmer, supra note 2, at 1363-65.
22. See Wendy Wilkinson, Judicially Crafted Barriers to Bringing Suit Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 38 S. TEX. L. REv. 907, 915 (1997).
23. See generally Pfeiffer, supra note 3, at 6-8.
24. Id. at 8.
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it took me several years of struggling with the heavy door to
my building, sometimes having to wait until a person
stronger came along, to realize that the door was an accessi-
bility problem, not only for me, but for others as well. And I
did not notice, until one of my students pointed it out, that
the lack of signs that could be read from a distance at my
university forced people with mobility impairments to ex-
pend a lot of energy unnecessarily, searching for rooms and
offices. Although I have encountered this difficulty myself
on days when walking was exhausting to me, I interpreted it,
automatically, as a problem arising from my illness (as I did
with the door), rather than as a problem arising from the
built environment having been created for too narrow a
range of people and situations. 25
The United Nations uses a definition of disability that is different
from the ADA:
Impairment: Any loss or abnormality of psychological, or an-
atomical structure or function.
Disability: Any restriction or lack (resulting from an impair-
ment) of ability to perform an activity in the manner or
within the range considered normal for a human being.
Handicap: A disadvantage for a given individual, resulting
from an impairment or disability, that limits or prevents the
fulfillment of a role that is normal, depending on age, sex,
social and cultural factors, for that individual.
Handicap is therefore a function of the relationship between
disabled persons and their environment. It occurs when
they encounter cultural, physical or social barriers which pre-
vent their access to the various systems of society that are
available to other citizens. Thus, handicap is the loss or limi-
tation of opportunities to take part in the life of the commu-
nity on an equal level with others.2 6
This definition reflects the idea that to a large extent, disability is a
social construct. Most people believe they know what is and is not a
disability. If you imagine "the disabled" at one end of a spectrum and
people who are extremely physically and mentally capable at the
other, the distinction appears to be clear. However, there is a tremen-
dous amount of middle ground in this construct, and it is in the mid-
25. SUSAN WENDELL, THE REJECTED BODY- FEMINIST PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON
DisABILITy 46 (1996).
26. UNITED NAnONS, DECADE OF DISABLED PERSONS 1983-1992: WORLD PROGRAMME OF
ACTION CONCERNING DISABLED PERSONS 3 (1997).
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dle that the scheme falls apart. What distinguishes a socially
"invisible" impairment-such as the need for corrective eyeglasses-
from a less acceptable one-such as the need for a corrective hearing
aid, or the need for a walker? Functionally, there may be little differ-
ence. Socially, some impairments create great disadvantage or social
stigma for the individual, while others do not. Some are considered
disabilities, and some are not.
The following examples further illustrate the difficulty of defin-
ing disability without consideration of social factors:
* A person who has a cochlear implant;
" A person who has a digestive disorder that requires follow-
ing a very restrictive diet and following a strict regime of
taking medications and could result in serious illness if
such regime is not adhered to;
" A person with serious carpal tunnel syndrome;
" A person who is very short.
It is likely that different people could have different responses to
the question of whether any of the above-listed characteristics would
result in "disability," and some might say, "It depends." This illustrates
the differences in the terms "disability" and "handicap" as used by the
United Nations. Any of the above traits could become a "handicap" if
the individual were considered disabled and also received disparate
treatment as a result.
Another example of the social construction of disability that is
especially relevant for determining whether a genetic predisposition
to disease is a disability is when society discriminates against an indi-
vidual who may have an "impairment" (in the sense of the United
Nations definition) without a corresponding functional limitation.
The power of culture alone to construct a disability is revealed
when we consider bodily differences-deviations from a society's con-
ception of a 'normal' or acceptable body-that, although they cause
little or no functional or physical difficulty for the person who has
them, constitute major social disabilities. An important example is fa-
cial scarring, which is a disability of appearance only, a disability con-
structed totally by stigma and cultural meanings. Stigma, stereotypes,
and cultural meanings are also the primary components of other disa-
bilities, such as mild epilepsy and not having a 'normal' or acceptable
body size.2
7
27. WENDELL, supra note 25, at 44.
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II. THE ADA DEFINITION OF DISABILITY
The definition of disability in the ADA reflects a recognition of
the social construction of disability, especially by including coverage
for persons who are perceived by others as having a disability.28 The
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's ADA Title I Tech-
nical Assistance Manual provides the following explanations of how
this prong of the definition is to be interpreted:
The individual may have an impairment which is not
substantially limiting, but is treated by the employer as hav-
ing such an impairment.
For example: An employee has controlled high blood
pressure which does not substantially limit his work activities.
If an employer reassigns the individual to a less strenuous job
because of unsubstantiated fear that the person would suffer
a heart attack if he continues in the present job, the em-
ployer has "regarded" this person as disabled.
The individual has an impairment that is substantially
limiting because of attitudes of others toward the condition.
For example: An experienced assistant manager of a
convenience store who has a prominent facial scar was
passed over for promotion to store manager. The owner be-
lieved that customers and vendors would not want to look at
this person. The employer discriminated against her on the
basis of disability, because he perceived and treated her as a
person with a substantial limitation.
The individual may have no impairment at all, but is re-
garded by an employer as having a substantially limiting
impairment.
For example: An employer discharged an employee
based on a rumor that the individual had HIV disease. This
person did not have any impairment, but was treated as
though she had a substantially limiting impairment.
This part of the definition protects people who are "per-
ceived" as having disabilities from employment decisions
based on stereotypes, fears, or misconceptions about disabil-
ity. It applies to decisions based on unsubstantiated con-
cerns about productivity, safety, insurance, liability,
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (1994). The ADA defines disability as
"(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment."
Id. § 12102(2)(A)-(C).
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attendance, costs of accommodation, accessibility, workers'
compensation costs or acceptance by co-workers and
customers.
Accordingly, if an employer makes an adverse employ-
ment decision based on unsubstantiated beliefs or fears that
-a person's perceived disability will cause problems in areas
such as those listed above, and cannot show a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the action, that action would
be discriminatory under this part of the definition.29
The definitions within a statute are related to the purpose of the
statute. This is especially relevant in the field of disability policy, as
one can find many different statutes, all with different definitions of
the term disability."0 The purpose of the ADA is to prevent discrimi-
nation and to provide a remedy for people who have experienced it.31
This is consistent with the disability model of understanding disability,
which places great importance on discrimination as a major cause of
disadvantage. In order to provide an appropriate remedy to the full
range of individuals who experience discrimination based on disabil-
ity, it is necessary to explicitly recognize that there are people who
would not consider themselves "disabled," nor would they be consid-
ered so by most others, but who receive the same disparate treatment
as "the disabled." Another important issue related to the topic of the
definition of disability has to do with disability identity. There are
many persons who arguably fit within the first prong of the ADA defi-
nition 2 who do not consider themselves disabled.
[IT] here are many reasons for not identifying yourself as dis-
abled, even when other people consider you disabled. First,
disability carries a stigma that many people want to avoid, if
29. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL
OF THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS (TITLE 1) OF THE AMERICANS wrrI DISABILITIES Acr, § 2.2
(c), 28 (1992).
30. The Social Security Act defines "disability" as the:
(A) inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of a medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result
in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months; or
(B) in the case of an individual who has attained the age of 55 and is blind
(within the meaning of "blindness" as defined in section 416 (i)(1) of this
title), inability by reason of such blindness to engage in substantial gainful
activity requiring skills or abilities comparable to those of any gainful activity
in which he has previously engaged with some regularity and over a substan-
tial period of time.
42 U.S.C. § 423(d) (1) (1994).
31. See id. § 12101(b) (1994).
32. See id. § 12102(2) (A) (1994).
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at all possible. For newly disabled people, and for children
with disabilities who have been shielded from knowledge of
how most non-disabled people regard people with disabili-
ties, it takes time to absorb the idea that they are members of
a stigmatized group. Newly disabled adults may still have the
stereotypes of disability that are common among non-dis-
abled people. They may be in the habit of thinking of disa-
bility as total, believing that people who are disabled are
disabled in all respects .... They may fear, with good rea-
son, that if they identify themselves as disabled, others will
see them as wholly disabled and fail to recognize their re-
maining abilities, or perhaps worse, see their every ability
and achievement as 'extraordinary' or 'courageous.' 33
The reason that so many people reject the label "disabled" is that
they seek to avoid the harsh social reality that is still so strong today.
Having a disability, even though the ADA has been in place for almost
a decade, still carries with it a great deal of stigmatization and stere-
otyping. It is ironic that those who could benefit from the law choose
not to do so because they wish to avoid the very social forces that this
law seeks to redress and eradicate.
People who might fall under the coverage of the ADA because of
the presence of a genetic marker are certainly not likely to think of
themselves as disabled. While there may be discomfort at the thought
of coming under this label, it is worthwhile to recognize that no one
with a disability, visible or otherwise, wants to experience the stigma
and discrimination that is still all too common for those who society
considers disabled. There are many others who do not consider
themselves to be disabled but who do experience discrimination. The
ADA ought to provide a legal remedy when this occurs. Since the
ADA definition seems to recognize the social construction of disabil-
ity, whether it could apply to a person ought to be a function of the
social treatment that the individual receives. In other words, the ques-
tion of whether a person with a genetic marker is covered by the defi-
nition should not arise in the abstract. If the individual has
experienced discrimination based on the individual's physical or
mental characteristics, then that individual should be able to take ad-
vantage of the ADA to redress that discrimination.
The courts have had a difficult time interpreting the ADA's com-
plex definition. There are numerous cases in which judges have
treated the ADA definition as though the purpose of the law is to pro-
vide a social benefit, rather than protect an individual from discrimi-
33. WENDELL, supra note 25, at 25-26.
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nation.34 In some cases, 5 the courts have placed an individual with a
disability in a catch-22 situation: if the individual has held ajob, then
this is proof that the individual is not disabled and therefore cannot
use the ADA to seek a remedy for employment discrimination.
III. THE DisABIITY COMMUNITY'S REAcTION TO THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATION OF DisABILrY
UNDER THE ADA
The U.S. Supreme Court decided three cases on the definition of
disability under the ADA at the end of the 1998-99 term: Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 36 Murphy v. United Parcel Service Inc., 7 and Albert-
sons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg.8 Each of these was an employment discrimi-
nation case in which the Court was presented with the question of
whether an individual with a medical condition that i , correctable or
ameliorated with medicine or technology can find protection under
the ADA.39 The Court was persuaded that the definition should be
interpreted narrowly, thereby excluding these plaintiffs from ADA
34. See, e.g., Van Sickle v. Automatic Data Processing Inc., 166 F.3d 1216 (6th Cir.
1998); Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760 (6th Cir. 1997).
35. See McNemar v. The Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 618-20 (3d Cir. 1996). Other
courts have not followed this line of reasoning. See, e.g, E.E.O.C. v. AIC Security Investiga-
tion, 820 F. Supp. 1060, 1066-67 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
36. 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).
37. 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999).
38. 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999).
39. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. brought before the Court the issue of whether
United's minimum vision requirement violated the ADA. The Court held that corrective
or mitigating measures, such as eyeglasses or contact lenses, should be considered in deter-
mining whether an individual is disabled under the ADA. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2143. As
a result, the Court held that the applicants were not disabled under the ADA definition.
See id. at 2149. In addition, the Court found that applicants failed to state a claim regard-
ing their contention that the airline had violated the ADA by regarding them as disabled.
See id. at 2150.
In Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., the Court addressed whether United Parcel Ser-
vice, Inc. violated the ADA by firing an employee because his blood pressure was in excess
of the limits set for commercial drivers by the Department of Transportation. Again, the
Court stated that the determination of whether a person is disabled under the ADA is
made with consideration of mitigating or corrective measures taken by the individual. See
Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2137. The Court did not consider whether the petitioner was disabled
because of limitations that persisted while on blood pressure medication. See id. The
Court stated that Murphy demonstrated that he was regarded as being substantially limited
in the major life activity of working. See id. at 2138.
Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg again raised the issue of whether firing an employee for
failing to meet minimum Department of Transportation vision requirements was a viola-
tion of the ADA. The Court held that vision below the standards required by one employer
does not make a person disabled; rather, such decisions should be made on a case-by-case
basis, focusing on substantial limitation of major life activities, as required by the ADA
definition of disabled. See Albertsons, 119 S. Ct. at 2168-69.
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coverage. The Court noted that Congress had expressly found that
there are forty-three million Americans with disabilities,4" and if that
figure was meant to include all individuals with medical conditions or
limitations, even those that are correctable or can be ameliorated, the
number would have been much higher.41
The disability advocacy and legal communities were stunned by
these decisions.42 The notion that the ADA should be used to protect
only persons who are somehow "truly" disabled, reflected in these
opinions, can be argued to be an unsophisticated or naive under-
standing of the nature of disability. Given the significance of social
and cultural influences in determining who is regarded as disabled, it
makes little sense to refuse to take these same influences into account.
Nevertheless, the Court strained to keep the definition under control
and rejected such arguments. 43
These decisions make it questionable whether a person with ge-
netic markers could seek the protection of the ADA to redress dis-
crimination. From a policy perspective, there are two possible options
that could be pursued to create a secure legal right to such protection:
(1) an amendment to the ADA to explicitly state that persons with
genetic markers are included within the definition; and/or (2) sepa-
rate legislation to redress discrimination based on genetic
characteristics.
As a result of these decisions, the first option, to seek an amend-
ment to the ADA, is under discussion within disability advocacy and
policy coalitions.' It is unlikely, however, that this course of action
will be followed because of the significant risks of opening the ADA to
unfriendly amendments in a potentially hostile political climate in
Congress. For this reason, it would be unwise to pursue an amend-
40. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147.
41. See id. at 2148. In defending the inclusion of corrective or mitigating factors in
determining whether someone is disabled, the Court referred to statistical findings from
ADA hearings approximating that 43 million Americans are disabled within the definition
included in the ADA. See i& The Court concluded that such a number reflected an inten-
tion to narrow the scope of the ADA, as compared with the health conditions approach,
which examines all conditions that affect health or functional abilities and which placed
the number of Americans who were by definition disabled at approximately 160 million.
See id
42. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Supreme Court Limits Meaning of Disability, WASH. POST, June
23, 1999, at Al; Erwin Chemerinsky, Unfulfilled Promise: The Americans with Disabilities Act,
TALkL, Sept. 1999, at 89-90; Mary Leonard, Justices Limit 1W Can Sue Over Disability: Court
Finds Impairments Unequal, BOSTON GLOBE, June 23, 1999, at Al.
43. See Sutton, 119 S. CL at 2149; Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2137-38; Albertsons, 119 S. Ct. at
2167-69.
44. See Biskupic, supra note 42, at Al; Chemerinsky, supra note 42, at 88; Leonard, supra
note 42, at Al.
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ment to the ADA that would only address the question of the status of
persons with genetic markers if doing so would place other segments
of the ADA in jeopardy of amendments designed to narrow its scope.
The second option is also politically and legally fraught with risk.
Politically, people with genetic markers are a much smaller group
than the very large confederation of disability organizations and indi-
viduals who came together to work towards passage of the ADA. Thus,
the chances of gaining the strong legal protections that are now avail-
able in the ADA are not very high. It could also be expected that well-
financed corporate interests would oppose such legislation. 45 Enact-
ment of any new legislation would be a tough, uphill battle that would
probably result in a compromised version of the original proposal.
However, this may be the strategy with lesser risk.
From a broad policy perspective, the better course would be to
find explicit coverage under the ADA, either through legislative
amendments from a relatively friendly Congress or through more
favorable court decisions. For those within the disability movement
who have no problem being identified as disabled, there are advan-
tages to coming under the coverage of the ADA and, indeed, to being
part of a community that is actively working to eradicate the discrimi-
nation and stigma that are our legacy. After decades of disparate
treatment with no meaningful legal protection or remedy, it is quite
satisfying to fight discrimination and to stand together to reject the
stigma and stereotypes that are the basis of disability-based discrimina-
tion. Most disability activists welcome the inclusion of persons with
invisible disabilities, as well as those who have faced discrimination by
individuals who regarded them as disabled even though they have no
real impairment. This is because we understand that freedom from
injustice is not an entitlement to be doled out in small doses. The
nature of disability discrimination is that it often has very little to do
with the individual's capabilities and true characteristics. The stigma
and stereotypes are the cause of the discrimination, much more than
the disability itself. It could be argued that the disability per se is not
the cause at all, that the social reaction to disability is the cause.
45. See general/yJeremy A. Colby, An Analysis of Genetic Discrimination Legislation Proposed
by the 105th Congress, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 443, 459-63 (1998) (describing the arguments of
interest groups, such as insurers and employers, against legislation that would prohibit
genetic discrimination).
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CONCLUSION
In seeking to avoid the stigma associated with disability, there is a
choice of strategies. Social and legal activism that challenge the as-
sumptions behind disability discrimination address the issues head on.
The goal is to eradicate the stigma. The decision to disassociate from
those who have historically been stigmatized tends to perpetuate the
stereotypes and discrimination.
The disability rights movement is working toward a society in
which physical and mental differences among people are accepted as
normal and expected, not abnormal or unusual. At the beginning of
the twenty-first century, we have plenty of methods and tools at our
disposal to accommodate human differences should we choose to.
The growth of technology in our lives provides us with both the ability
to detect more human differences than ever before, as well as the abil-
ity to make those differences less meaningful in practical terms. How
we react to human differences is a social and a policy choice. The
disability community prefers to advocate for a social structure that fo-
cuses on including all people in the social fabric, rather than drawing
an artificial line that separates "disabled people" from others.
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